

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
BRUNSWICK DIV.

2006 DEC 12 A II: 38

CLERK *S. LaVictoire*
SO. DIST. OF GA.

JERMAINE TYRONE FULLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN TERWILLIGER, Superintendent,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV206-277

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff has filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 alleging certain violations of his constitutional rights. A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that *pro se* pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 654 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).

28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical

to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. The court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond a doubt that a *pro se* litigant can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 169-70 (1980); Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this Court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.


Plaintiff contends that on December 21, 2004, he was unlawfully detained and questioned by a police officer. Plaintiff further contends that he was arrested several days later and coerced into signing a plea agreement. Plaintiff asserts that his probation officer “neglect[ed] to do his job.” Plaintiff contends that Defendant Terwilliger, the superintendent, is violating his rights by “detaining” him.

Plaintiff has named only Superintendent Terwilliger as Defendant, without making any specific factual allegations against this individual. It appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant liable based solely on his supervisory role. In section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged violations. Id. at 802.

CONCLUSION

It is my **RECOMMENDATION** that Plaintiff's complaint be **DISMISSED**.

SO REPORTED and **RECOMMENDED**, this 12th day of December, 2006.



JAMES E. GRAHAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE